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An essential generalization of Berge's variant of the Zermelo—von Neumann theorem (and of 
the original result of Zermelo) is proved. Our theorem concerns quite general non-ordered games 
with perfect information and with chain-valued pay-off functions, and it admits infinite plays. 
Important particular cases are considered. A further generalization (poset-valued pay-offs) is shown. 
§0. I N T R O D U C T I O N 
We shall consider quite general non-ordered games with perfect information, but 
without chance moves. ("Non-ordered games" means "non-initial games on oriented 
graphs". The considered games may have infinitely many positions or players, 
infinite plays are admitted, and the pay-off functions are chain-valued.) 
Under our conception, at any moment of every play (of a game with perfect 
information) the moving player knows the preceding course (including the momentary 
position) of the play. In a contradistinction to the usually investigated games on 
(finite rooted) trees, in the considered games position need not "involve" the preced-
ing course of play; consequently, at defining the general (pure) strategies it is neces-
sary to introduce certain auxiliary notions ("segments" etc., see § 5). Nevertheless, 
the case if players use only the knowledge of momentary position is to be considered 
as the most important; the strategies corresponding to this case are called plain 
(§§ 2.6, 5.6.3, 5.7.6). 
The notion of (pure) equilibrium point in a position (of a game with perfect 
information) can be introduced in the usual way; a system of strategies which is an 
equilibrium point in each position of a game is called an absolute equilibrium point 
of the game. An equilibrium point is called plain if it consists only of plain strategies. 
(Cf. §§ 2 and 5.) 
The basic known result—the so-called Zermelo—von Neumann theorem—concerns 
only the games (with perfect information; chance moves are admitted) on finite 
rooted trees. This theorem was obtained by H. W. Kuhn ([7], § 4) as a corollary of 
his considerations on the decomposition of certain games; of course, it can be proved 
directly, by induction (cf., e.g., McKinsey's book [10], ch. VI, § 2, Th. 6.1). Never-
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theless, the original result of Zermelo (in [14]) concerns (chess and similar) games 
which admit also infinite plays. 
C. Berge has introduced and investigated (cf. [1], Ch. 1 of [2], and Ch. 6 and 
Appendix 1 of [3]) games (with perfect information) which are more natural and 
more general than the usually considered games on finite rooted trees, namely non-
-ordered games with perfect information. (Our conception of the latter games is 
somewhat more general than that of Berge. Cf. § 2.) The Berge equilibrium point 
theorem (it involves —after the elimination of chance moves —the above mentioned 
variant of the Zermelo —von Neumann theorem as a special case see [2], Ch. I, 
§ 7 — the fundamental theorem, and [3], Ch. 6 — the Zermelo — von Neumann theorem) 
says that if a Bergean game with perfect information is locally finite (i.e., it has no 
infinite play) and each of its evaluation functions is finite-valued, then the game has 
(speaking in the terminology of the present paper) a plain absolute equilibrium point 
(but cf. §§ 3.6, 3.5, 2.8 — 9!). (Berge considers very special pay-off functions, namely 
those corresponding to "active" or "passive" players. Cf. § 2.4.0.) The proof can 
be performed in a natural way, but by means of transfinite induction (starting from 
the end-positions). 
The original result of Zermelo (see [14]) concerns very special antagonistic (see 
§ 2.11) games with perfect information. This result can be generalized in several ways; 
I proved several such theorems even for a somewhat more general kind of non-ordered 
antagonistic games (namely antagonistic complete games; the results of this charac-
ter are based mainly on theorems 6.25/1—3 and 3.11 of [4]; they will be published 
in some of the following parts of [4], their preliminary variant is presented in [5]). 
The main purpose of this paper is to generalize Berge's variant of the Zermelo —von 
Neumann theorem. Our main theorem gives an essential generalization in four 
ways: the notion of plain absolute equilibrium point is "stronger" and more natural 
than Berge's notion of absolute equilibrium point (cf. §§ 3.6, 2.8 — 9); the class of 
considered game structures (i.e. games without respecting pay-off functions) is some-
what richer (cf. §2); the class of pay-off functions (those satisfying the sufficient 
condition of the theorem) is much richer, also after restriction to the locally finite 
case; there exist games having infinite plays and satisfying the sufficient condition 
of the theorem. The latter way of generalization is to be considered as the most prin-
cipal, since the usual proof idea is quite inapplicable if infinite plays are possible. 
(Cf. § 5.9.) Naturally, that sufficient condition is sizably strong (e.g., for each player 
of a game, all the infinite plays give the same pay-off) — the existence of a plain absolu-
te equilibrium point is a "very strong property" (cf. § 5.8.1-2). 
A certain part of the proof method (for the main theorem) is taken from the proof 
of the equilibrium point theorem in [6] (§ 3.13; this theorem concerns a class of 
finite complete (two-player) games), but the fact that infinite games are admitted 
in the present paper has led to essential complications (connected, among others, 
with the necessity of the use of transfinite induction), while the simpler structure of 
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games with perfect information (in comparison with complete games) made possible 
tp use some simplifications (cf. § 5.11); there are some other disparities. 
Of course, we wish to obtain a theorem which sufficiently utilizes the new proof 
idea. This aim has led, especially, to the introduction of two auxiliary "technical" 
conditions ((A) and (B)) in the main theorem. There is a number of various particular 
cases (having self-contained meanings) in which the satisfaction of the whole sufficient 
condition is to be seen immediately; among others, the Berge theorem and the 
original result of Zermelo belong to these particular cases. (Cf. § 3.) 
In this paper we consider chain-valued pay-off functions. Nevertheless, it is possible 
to introduce poset-valued pay-off functions, and to obtain some generalization of 
our results (§ 3) in a simple way; cf. §§ 5.0-5.5. 
§1. ORIENTED GRAPHS. PSEUDOLENGTHS. 
SPECIAL PAY-OFF FUNCTIONS 
1.0. Preliminaries. We shall use the accepted logical and set theoretical denotations 
and notions (~~|- A , v, =>; "iff" is to be read "if and only if"; 0 means the empty set, 
X denotes the general cartesian product, etc.). For a set A, card ,4 denotes the cardinal 
number of A, and we write exp A = {B; B s A} (the Boolean of A). Under a binary 
relation we mean a set of ordered pairs. Mappings are considered as special binary 
relations :f = {(f(x)9 x); x e domf} for any mappingf(where "dom" is the domain), 
and we writef = (f(x); x e domf), while {f(x); x e domf} = imf There is exactly 
one mapping with empty domain (the empty mapping), namely 0. For a mapping f 
and a set A £ domf, the restriction off to A is denoted byfM (= (f(x); xe A) = 
= (im f x A) nf); of course, if g e f, then g = f| dom g. At mappings denoted by 
Greek letters, sometimes we do not write parentheses. 
A partially ordered set (poset) is a pair V = (V, :g), where V is a set and <; £ 
£ V x Vis a binary relation which is reflexive (on V), antisymmetric, and transitive; 
if is said to be a chain (or a totally ordered set, or a linearly ordered set) iff, moreover, 
^ is full on V. (We say that p £ v x V is full on V iff V x V = p'1 u p.) We 
shall use the accepted elementary notions, denotations, and conventions for posets; 
especially, if we consider several posets or a system of posets, we often use the symbols 
g, >, sup, min etc. without index (whenever no misunderstanding can arise by it). 
1.1. Chains. Let^ = (V, <0 be a chain, if is said to be complete iff sup A and 
inf A exist for any A £ V (i.e., iff the chains is a complete lattice), if is said to be 
well-ordered {inversely well-ordered] iff min A [max A] exists for any nonempty 
A £ V. It is easy to prove that if is well-ordered and (at the same time) inversely 
well-ordered iff V is finite. 
1.2. Preference relations. Under a preference relation on a set X we mean a binary 
relation k ^ X x X which is reflexive (on X), full (on X), and transitive. 
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Let X be a set, i? = (V, JO be a set with a preference relation, l e t f : X - > V. 
Then the relation k(f>r) = {(xl9x2); xi9 x2e X9 ffa) :gf(x2)} is a preference 
relation on X. 
On the other hand, if X is a set and k is a preference relation on X, then there exist 
a chain-1T = (V, = ) and a mapping f: X->.V such that <£ = k(f,ry [It is suf-
ficient to choose V = X/(=
 - 1 n = ) = {{>>; 7 e X, y = x, x ^ >>}; x e X} (the 
decomposition corresponding to the. equivalence relation =
_ 1 n k)9 f = ({y; 
y e X, y k x9 y — y}; x e X) (the natural surjection of X onto V), and 51 = {(f(*i), 
f(x2)); xt, x2 e X, xx k x2}. We shall d e n o t e ^ = 1f andf| = ffor thosef andf] 
1.3. Quasiorderings. Under a quasiordering on a set X we mean a binary relation 
(in X) which is reflexive (on X) and transitive. It is easy to see that it is admissible 
to re-formulate § 1.2 in the following way: "quasiordering" is to be written instead 
of "preference relation", "poset" is to be written instead of "chain", and "full 
(on X), " is to be omitted. ^ 
1.4. Let X be a set, let Vk = (Vk9 ^k) be chains and fk : X-> Vk for k = 1, 2. 
We say thatfj w i t h ^ andf2 w i t h ^ 2 express the same preference iff k(furi) = 
= k(f2tir2y We say thatfx w i t h ^ andf2 withiT2 express antagonistic preferences 
iff S(fitfrt) = (^(/i ,^)) • 
1.5. Definition, remarks. Let ^ be a preference relation on a set X. We introduce 
binary relations kE (e = + , —) on (exp X)\ {0} in such a way: for 0 ^ A, 5 = X 
A k + Bo for each a e A there exists b e B such that a <£ b; 
A k ~ B <-> for each 6 e B there exists a e A such that a k b. 
These two relations are preference relations on (exp X)\ {0}. [Evidently, they are 
reflexive and transitive. If 0 / A9 B £ X, ~ | # _"
 + A , then there exists b0eB such 
that ~~]b0 k a for each a e A, but then a k b0 for each a e A9 and, therefore, 
A ^ +2?. The fullness of k ~ can be proved analogously.] 
In particular, if k = k(f^r) for some complete c h a i n s = (V, <;) and a suitable 
mapping f:X-> V, then (for e = + , —) there holds: ke = k ( / e > r ) , where the 
mappingf& : (exp X)\ {0} -• V is defined in such a way: 
f+(A) = sup {f(a);aeA}9 f~(A) = inf {f(a); ae A}9 
where 0 # A. £ K, and sup and inf are taken i n f . (The proof is simple.) 
The motivation of the introduction of k + and k ~ is connected with preference 
relations and pay-off functions in Bergean games with perfect information. (See 
§2.4.1.) 
1.6. Graphs. Under an oriented graph (or only: a graph; we shall consider only 
oriented graphs) we undersand a mapping T such that 
imT £ e x p d o m F 
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(this definition conforms to Berge's conception of oriented graphs; we do not denote 
a graph by (T, X) with T : X -> exp X, as X = dom T is given by T). 
1.7. Convention. (Positions.) If a fixed graph T is considered, we use symbols P, 
P0, Z in the.following sense: 
P = domT, P0 = {x;xeP, Tx = 0}, Z = P\P0; 
the elements of P (i.e., the vertices of the graph T) [P0; Z ] will be called positions 
[final positions, or terminal positions; nonfinal positions, or nonterminal positions] 
(respectively). 
1.8 Our interpretation of graphs corresponds to that of Berge: if V is a graph, 
xeP, then y e Tx occurs iff"T contains an edge which goes from x to y"; therefore, 
a vertex (position) is terminal iff there does not exist an edge going from it. In our 
considerations (in the following §§), T will usually be the graph of a game, and then 
Tx means the set of (all) positions which can follow immediately after x; any play 
(cf. §1A3) of such a game is performed in the following way: at a nonfinal position x, 
the moving player chooses an element y e Tx as the next (following) position, while 
at any final position the play terminates. 
1.9. Transformations. Let T be a graph. The set 
T(V)= u Xrz 
YCZ zey 
is said to be the set of plain T-transformations; we shall say "I"^-transformation", 
too (as the general T-transformations are not considered in the main parts of this 
paper; cf. § 5.6.1). E.g., 0 is a V-transformation (the empty T-transformation). aeT{T) 
is said to befw// iff dom a = Z. TF(T) will denote the set of full T-transformations. 
Under a conservative T-transformation we mean G e T(T) such that im <T c ? 0 u 
u dom a; of course, the empty V-transformation and also all full T-transforma-
tions are conservative. Clearly, a subset of a T-transformation is a V-trans-
formation, too. 
1.10. Denotation. In the whole paper, we denote 
W={0, l , 2 , . . . } u { o o } 
and, for any leW, 
^ = {/c;fcê ,/c<l + /}(=|^
1
{-}'
/ }} if '£}«>). 
(1 + oo = oo). if will denote W with the natural ordering. 
1.11. Definition. Let / e W, let y = (yk; k e W{) (be a mapping of Wx\ and let x 
be an element. Then we put x ® y = (xk; k e JVi + 0> where x0 = x and xk+1 = yk 
for each ke Wt. 
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1.12. Definition. Let le W, let x = (xk; ke Wt) (be a mapping of W,), let meW{. 
Then we put x[w] = (xk+m; k e Wt_m) (oo - m = oo); x
[m] is called the mth re-
mainder of x. 
1.13. Definitions, remarks. (Plays.) Let T be a graph. We say that x is a T-play 
(or only "aplay", if T is fixed) iff x = (xk;ke Wt) for some / e W and some elements 
xkeP such that xk+l e Txk for each k < I, and xkeP0 if / < oo (cf. § 1.10). X r 
(or only X) denotes the set of all T-plays. We say that x = (xk; k e Wt) e X starts 
from x iff x0 = x Tx will denote the set of all plays which start from xeP, and F 
is considered as the corresponding mapping, i.e. F = (Tx; xeP). Clearly, X = \J Tx, 
xeP 
and Txn Ty = 0 if x, y eP, x ?- y; it is easy to see that Tx # 0 for each xeP. 
If x e P0, then Fx contains exactly one element, namely Tx = {(xk; k = 0)}, where 
x0 = x; we shall denote this T-play by (x). We say that x = (xk; k e Wt) e X 
passes inY_zP iff {xk; k e Wt} £ Y. 
For x = (xk; k e Wt) e X we denote L(x) = / (the length of x; x is said to be 
infinite iff L(x) = oo). L (or L r) itself is considered as the corresponding mapping 
(L r == L = (L(x) x e X) : X -> W), and it is called the (natural) length on T. 
T is said to be locally finite (or progressively finite; cf. [2], ch. I, § 7, or [3], ch. 3) 
iff L(x) < oo for each x e X (i.e. iff T has no infinite play). Of course, it may happen 
that T is finite (i.e. P is finite) and is not locally finite, or conversely. 
Evidently, if x e X and m e WUx), then x
[m] € X. If x, y e P, y e Ty, then x © 
© Y e X iff y e Tx. 
Supposition. In the remainder of § 1, let T be a fixed graph, X = X r . 
1.14. Transformations anil plays. Let a e T(T), x = (xk; k e Wt) e X. We say 
that x complies with a iff 
k < I, xke dom a => xk+i = axk. 
It is easy to see that if a is a conservative T-transformation and x e P0 u dom a, 
then there exists exactly one xeTx which complies with a; this T-play will be denoted 
by p(x, a). 
Clearly, if x e P, y e Tx, y e Ty, a e T(T), and if y complies with a, then x © y 
complies with a iff y = ax. 
1.15. Plain sets of plays, r c X i s said to be plain iff there holds: if x = (xk; 
keWr)eY,Y = (y*; k e W5) e Y, m < r, n < s, xm = yx, then xm+v = yn+l. 
It is easy to see that Y _z X is plain iff there exists a e TF(T) such that any xeY 
complies with a. 
1.16. Pay-off functions. A (general) pay-off function on T is given by a chain 
^ = (V> ti) and a mapp ing / : X~> V (but usual ly / is called "pay-off function", 
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w h i l e s is to be given separately); the pay-off function is said to be real-valued iff 
the chain of real numbers may be taken as t h a t f . 
1.17. Pseudolengths. A pseudolength on T is given by a chain iV* = (W*9 ^ * ) 
having the greatest element (the latter will be denoted by oo*) and by a mapping 
L* : X -» W* such that the following conditions are satisfied (for any x e X, x e P): 
D(l) L(x) = oo=>L*(x) = oo* 
D(2) y e Tx, Yi>Yie J>, L*(yX) ^ * L*(y2) => L*(x © Yi) £ * L*(* 0 y2) 
D(3) j e Tx, y e J>, L*(x 0 y) < * oo * => L*(x © y) > * L*(y); 
of course, in such a case there holds 
D'(2) y e Tx, Yi, y2 e J>, L*(yt) = L*(y2) => L*(x © X l) = L*(x © y2) 
D'(3) y e Tx, y e J> => L*(x © y) = * L*(y). 
E.g., L (with iV) is a pseudolength. Further, the constant mapping of X into {oo} 
(with the one-element chain containing oo) is a pseudolength; it will be called the 
trivial pseudolength. (We have not said ". . .onto {oo}", as it may happen T = 0, 
then X = 0, and the trivial pseudolength is the empty mapping.) 
1.18. Qualitative pay-off functions. Let L* with a chain iV* be a pseudolength on T. 
Under an L*-qualitative (or, more exactly speaking, (L*, l^*)-qualitative) pay-off 
function (on T) we mean a real-valued pay-off function/* on T such that the follow-
ing conditions are satisfied (for any x e X): 
D(o) / * ( x ) e { - 1 , 0 , + 1 } 
D(i) L(x) = oo ==>/*(x) = 0 
D(ii) /*(x) = 0 ==> L*(x) = oo* 
D(iii) 0 < L(x) =->/*(x) =/*(x£13); 
of course, in such a case there holds (for x == (xk;ke Wt)) 
D'(in) L(x) < oo =>/*(x) = /*((xL(x))) ( = r (*
[ L ( x ) 3 ) ) , 
i.e., the pay-off for a finite play is determined by the terminal position of the play, 
while (cf. D(i)) any infinite play gives 0 as the pay-off. 
E.g., the constant mapping of X into {0} is an L*-qualitative pay-off function. 
1.19. Quasiqualitative pay-off functions. Let L* with a chain W* be a pseudolength 
on T, le t /* be an L*-qualitative pay-off function. Let / w i t h a chain 'V be a pay-off 
function on T. We say t h a t / i s an L5*-quasiqualitative pay-off function complying 
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with f* iff the following conditions are satisfied (for any *, y» Y\ > Y2 e X, x e P; cf. 
§ 1.0): 
D(I) y e rx, Yl,Y2e ry,f(Yl) = / ( y 2 ) =>f(x ® Yl) = A
x ® Yi) 
D(2) /*(x) < /*(y) =>/(x) = / (y ) 
D(3) /*(x) = /*(y) = | + 1 | , L*(x) < L*(y) => f(x) | | J /(y), 
D(4) /* (x) = /*(y) = 0, L*(x) = oo* = L*(y) =>/(x) = / (y ) ; 
of course, D(4) can be expressed equivalently in such a way: 
D(4A) /* (x) = / * ( y ) = 1, L*(x) = 00* = L*(y) =>/(x) = / ( y ) , 
D(472) /*(x) = /*(y) = 0 => / (x ) = / (y ) 
(cf. D(o), D(ii)). 
E.g., the function/* itself (with the chain of real numbers) is an L*-quasiqualitative 
pay-off function complying wi th /* (namely, then D(l) follows from D(iii)). 
1.20. The interpretation (cf. §§ 1.17 — 19). Let L* with a chain iV* be a pseudo-
length, let / * be an L*-qualitative pay-off function, let / be an L*-quasiqualitative 
pay-off function complying with/*. 
L* can be interpreted as a certain criterion of the continuance of plays; 00* means 
the "very long" continuance. The conditions D(l) —D(3) are natural and their 
meanings are clear. 
+ 1 [0; —1] means (as a value o f / * ) "win" ["draw"; "loss"]; therefore, any 
infinite play is drawn (under/*, see D(ii)), and the "qualitative result" of any finite 
play x is equal to the natural evaluation f*((x)) of its terminal position x (cf. Di(iii)). 
The condition D(ii) has a special character; only "very long" plays may be drawn. 
Note that the important condition (of a certain monotony at one-move extensions 
of plays) expressed by D(2) for L* and by D(T) for / is not so strong as could be 
expected; cf. § 1.25.1. 
The meanings of the other conditions are clear: D(2) expresses the compliance off 
withf*; D(3) says that "more rapidly" (in the sense given by L*) won [lost] T-plays 
are (nonstrongly) better [worse]: D(4.1) says that all "very long" won plays have the 
same value (under/); similarly, D(4.2) says that all drawn plays (ihzy are "very long", 
see D(ii)) have the same value. 
1.21. Lemma. Let T be locally finite. Let f with a chain'V be a pay-off function on F. 
Then the following statements are equivalent: 
(A) There exists a pseudolength L* (on T) with a chain if* and an L*-qualitative 
pay-offfunction f* (on T) such that f is an L*-quasiqualitative pay-off function com-
plying withf*. 
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(B) / is an L°-quasiqualitative pay-off function complying with f° where L° is the 
trivial pseudolength on T, and (the L°-qualitative pay-off function) f° is the mapping 
of X into { — 1}. 
(C) f satisfies the condition D(T). 
Proof. Evidently,/0 is an L°-qualitative pay-off function. Of course, (B) => (A), 
and (A) => (C). If (C) is satisfied, then D(o)-(iii) and D(2)-(4) with L* = L°, 
/ * = / o are satisfied in a trivial way, while D(T) is satisfied by the supposition; hence, 
(B) holds. Therefore, (C) => (B). 
1.22. Lemma. Let f be a real-valued pay-off function on T. Let the following conditions 
be satisfied (for any x e X, xeP); 
(a) L(x) = oo =>/(x) = 0 
(/?) y e Tx, X l , y2 e J>, \f(Yl) \ = \f(Yi) I => l/(* ® Yi) I = \f(x ® Yi) I 
(?) L(x) > 0, /(xc l ]) | | } 0 -> f(xtl])||} f(x)||}0. 
Let itr* = (W*, <;*) be the chain with W* = [0, oo] x [0,oo] and with the lexico-
graphic ordering as ^ *, let oo* = (oo, oo) (the greatest element ofiT*). 
Let mappings f* and L* ofXbe defined in the following way: 
™ _ { r «-"">> , Lw {;:}«, 
L*(X) = (TTOOT' L ( x ) j if f(x){*}o, 
(for any x e X), where sgn a = 1 [0: — 1] if a > 0 [a = 0: a < 0]. 
7%e/z L* with iV* is a pseudolength (on T),f* is an L*-qualitative pay-off function, 
and f is an L*-quasiqualitative pay-off function complying withf*. 
Proof. There holds; 
08') [ye Tx, Yl,y2e ry,f(Yl) = / ( y 2 ) =>/(* © Yi) £ f(x ® y2)] ($. D(T)) 
(/) L (x )>0=> | / (x^) | = | / (x) | 
(/) iA-oi{fj/^'} if L(x){:}oo, 
(/") /*(*) = sgn/(x) 
[see: (ft) and (y); (y); (y') and (a); (y) and (a) (respectively)]. 
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The satisfaction of DD(o), (i), (iii), (4) follows from the definitions given by the 
lemma. The satisfaction of DD(1), (2), (3), (ii), (I), (2), (3) follows from: (a); (p); 
( / ) ; ( / ) ; (P')l (/"); (y") (respectively). Thus, the lemma is proved. 
1.23. Lemma. Let 0 ?~ T <= [0, oo), let <p : T x {0,1, 2,. . .} -> [0, oo) be such that 
for any t, tl,t2e T, lt, l2 e {0, 1, 2,. . .} there holds; 
(a.l) fj < t2=^cp(t1,li) < cp(t2,l2) 
(a.2) h<h*> <p(t, lt) = <p(t, l2) 
(b) <p(t, /,) = <?(/, /i + 1) =-> «p(f, /2) = <p(*. /i) /or each /2 = lx. 
Lef h be a (real-valued) function on P0 such that 
{ |h(x) | ;xGP0} s P. 
Lef / be the real-valued pay-off function (on T) such that for an arbitrary x = 
== (xk;keWi)eX there holds 
/ ( x ) = H^)U0.sgnh(x f) | .f J < | 
Then the conditions (a), (j8), (y) (§ V22) are satisfied (by this f). 
Proof, (a) follows immediately from the definition of/, (y) is to be derived by 
means of (a.2). Let x e Z, x, y e Tx, x = (xk; k e Wh), y = (yk; k e Wh), | / (x
[ 1 ]) | = 
= | / (y
[ l ] ) |. If lt = oo, then | / (x ) | = 0 = | /(y) |. If l2 = oo, then L(y
fli) -= oo, 
| / (x) | = | / ( x ^ ) | ^ | / (y
t l ] ) | = 0 (see (y), (a)), i.e. | / (x) | = 0 = | / (y) |. Let lt < co, 
/2 < oo. We put rx = | h(xh) \, r2 = | h(>>/2) |. Thus, | / (x) | = cp(rx, I,), |/(y) | -= 
= <p(r2, l2), <p(rx,h - 1) = \f(x)
w | = | /(y
Cl]) | = ?(r2 , /2 - 1). Hence, r, g r2 
(see (a.l)). If rx < r2, then (cf. above and again (a.l)) | / (x) | < | / (y) |. Let rx = 
= r2 = r. If lx = /2, then | / (x) | = <p(r, /x) = <p(r, /2) = | /(y) | (see (a.2)). Now, 
lfct lx < /2. Then /x - 1 < / t = /2 - 1, and <p(r, lt - 1) = <p(f, 'i) = <Kr> /2 ~ 1) = 
= <p(r, /j - 1) (cf. above and (a.2)), hence (p(r, lx - 1) == <p(r, lx), thus (cf. (b)) 
| / (x) | = cp(r, lx) = cp(r, l2) = | / (y) |. We have proved that | / (x) | ^ | / (y) | in any 
case. Consequently, there holds even 
(Pf) xx,. x2 e rx, \f(x\") | = | M
1 ] ) | => | / ( x 0 | S l/(x2) |, 
which, of course, implies (/?). 
1.24. Important particular cases of the situations considered in §§ 1.22 — 1.23. 
1.24.1. (Cf. § 1.21.) Let T be locally finite. LefT = (V, S) be a chain, let 
F: {(x, >>, v); x e P, y e Tx, v e V) -> V, 
let (for any (x, y, vt), (x, y, v2) e dom F) 




It is easy to prove (by induction) that there exists exactly one mapping / : X-* V 
(it, together with V, will be considered as a pay-off function on T) such that 
f((x)) = h0(x) if xePo, 
f(x 0 y) = F(x, y, F(y)) if x e P, y e Tx, y e Ty. 
Evidently, f satisfies the condition D(l). 
In particular, if o is a binary operation on V such that (V, o, :g) is a linearly 
ordered abelian semigroup (hence, if vx, v2, v3, v4 e V, then vx ^ v2 A v3 g v4 
implies vt o v3 = v2 o v4), and h : P -> V (the so-called evaluation function), then, 
if we choose F and h0 such that 
F(x, y, v) = h(x) o v for any xeZ,yeTx,veV, 
h0 = h|Po, 
we have a particular case of the above introduced situation, and 
f(x) = h(x0) o h(xv) o ... o h(xd 
for any x = (xk; k e Wt) e X. E.g., it is possible to choose the set of real numbers 
as V, the natural ordering as ^ , and o = max or o = min (where "max" and "min" 
are considered as binary operations) or o = + ; clearly, the case o = max [o = min] 
gives exactly the "active" ["passive"] pay-off functions (on the locally finite graph T) 
in the sense introduced by Berge (cf., e.g., [2], ch. I. § 2). 
It is easy to generalize somewhat the case with ("vertex-") evaluation, e.g. by 
introducing some "mixed" evaluation (given by some end-vertex evaluation h0 : P0 —> 
-• Vand an "edge evaluation" hE : {(x,y); xeP, yeTx} -» V). 
1.24.2. (Cf. § 1.23.) Let g be a real-valued pay-off function on T, let g(x) = 0 
z/L(x) = oo, let#(x) depend only on the terminal position ofx //L(x) < oo. Choosing 
T = [0, oo), and (see § 1.23) <p(t, r) = / for each / e T, r = 0, 1, 2 , . . . , h(x) = g((x)) 
for each xeP0, we see tha t£ = / w h e r e / i s given by § 1.23 to the above described 
T, cp, h. 
1.24.3. (Cf. § 1.23.) A real-valued pay-off function / * is said to be qualitative 
iff it satisfies the conditions DD(o) (i), (iii); the interpretation is the same as that (of 
/ * ) mentioned in § 1.20. If we wish to express such an interest under which (at a given 
qualitative pay-off function / * ) more rapidly won [lost] plays are considered as 
better [worse], we can choose, e.g., T = {0, \},q>(t, r) = (teT,r = 0,1,2, . . . ) 
1 + r 
h(x) =/*((*)) (see § 1.23), and then the pay-off function / given by § 1.23 expresses 
the above mentioned interest. 
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1.25. D(l), D(4), and some stronger conditions. Let / with a chain *V = (V, = ) 
be a pay-off function on V. 
1.25.1. We introduce condition 
D(I+) yk 6 Tx, y* G Z>k(k = 1, 2,),/(Xl) = /(y2) =>/(* 0 Xl) <f(x © y2), 
which is, evidently, stronger than D(I). 
E.g., the pay-off functions/in the special case in § 1.24.1 (that in which/is given 
by A, at (V, o, ^)) and in §§ 1.24.2-3 satisfy even D(T+). 
1.25.2. Further, we introduce condition 
D(4+) /* (x)=/*(y) , L*(x) = a>* = L*(y)=>/(x)=/(y), 
which is, evidenty stronger than D(4). 
E.g., the pay-off function / considered in § 1.22 (which, of course, involves the 
cases considered in §§ 1.23, 1.24.2-3), with L* and/* introduced there, satisfies D(4+) 
(as, even, L*(x) = oo* implies/(x) = 0, in § 1.22). 
1.26. On the linear transformations at real-valued pay-off functions. 
Let / be a real-valued pay-off function on T, let X # 0 and c be real numbers, 
let g = c 4- Xf(= (c -f Xf(x); x e X)). There is a number of trivial but very useful 
auxiliary propositions on transfering the properties o f / t o g; we shall need the 
following ones: 
a) If X > 0 [A < 0], then / and g express the same preference [antagonistic 
preferences]. 
b) If/satisfies (a), (j5), (y) (§1.22) and c = 0, then g satisfies (a), (J?), (y). If/ is 
given by some cp and h in the sense described in § 1.23, then g is given by q> and h . 
.sgnA. 
c) Let L* (with some iT*) be a pseudolength (on T), let/* be an L*-qualitative 
pay-off function. Let g* = / * . sgn X. Then g* is an L*-qualitative pay-off function. 
If/is an L*-quasiqualitative pay-off function complying with/*, and if 
either X > 0, 
or X < 0 and/satisfies D(4+), 
then # is an L*-qua$iqualitative pay-off function complying with#*. 
Note that linear transformations can be applied also in such a way: real numbers 
Xk -̂  0, ck(k = 1, 2) are given, and pay-off functions fk = ck -f Afc/are considered; 
of course, then/,..* = (c^k - - ^ y ^ ) + ^j^fk for k = 1, 2. 
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§2. G A M E S W I T H P E R F E C T I N F O R M A T I O N 
2.1. Partitions. We say that (P(j)J 6 J) is a partition of a set P iff (J is a set, P(j) 
are sets, and) \J P(j) = P. 
JeJ 
Convention. If a partition (P(j); je J) of a set P is given, we denote, for each 
x E P, by j(x) that element of J for which 
xGP(./(x)) 
(of course, there exists exactly one such j(x)). 
2.2. Definition. Under a game with perfect information (we write only g. p. /., too) 
we mean a 4-tuple 
CS = (T9(P(j)JeJ)9(ri = (V,, Sj)JeJY(fj;jeJ)) 
such that T is an oriented graph, (P(j); J'e J) is a partition of P = dom V, rTj is 
a chain, and/} : X r -> Vi (i.e.,j} withiT; is a pay-off function on F) for each fe / . 
^ is said to have a property introduced for graphs (cf. § 1.13) iffT has this property. 
2.3. Definition; remarks on the interpretation. Let 
CS = (r9(P(j);jeJ)9(rj = (VJ9 £j);jeJ)9(fj;jeJ)) 
be a g.p.i. T is said to be the graph of ^ , (r , (P(j); j e J)) is called the game structure 
given by ^ , and 
( r , ( P ( j ) ; y e J ) ; ( ^ ( / i , ^ ) ; f G J ) ) 
is called the preference form of CS. 
The interpretation ofT, P, P0, Z, X = X r (cf. convention 1.7) is given by § 1.8. 
J is the set of players (if J = 0, then necessarily P = 0)./} withiT/ je J) is the pay-off 
function of player j . P(j) is the set of all the positions at which it is the player fs turn 
to move (of course, actually j moves only at the positions from Z n P(j)). A play 
(starting from some position x0eP) is performed in the natural way (cf. § 1.8); 
if x is a momentary nonfinal position of the play, then the moving (i.e. the choice 
of an element of Tx (as the next position) performing) player i$j(x). 
The preference form of a g.p.i. is not so natural as the formally defined g.p.i. 
(§ 2.2) itself, but, on the other hand, all the notions and properties introduced in this 
paper for games with perfect information could be formulated in terms of the preference 
forms [see, in particular, §2.10; of course, some notions (e.g., plain strategy) can 
be introduced in terms of game structures or even in terms of graphs (e.g. plays)]. 
Note that any triple 
(r9(P(j);jeJ)jkjJeJ)) 
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where T is an oriented graph, (P(j);jeJ) is a partition of P = dom T, and kj(jeJ) 
are preference relations on X r — such an object will be called a g.p.i. in preference 
form —is the preference form of a suitable g.p.i. (e.g., of 
(T, (P(f); j e J), (rh ; j e J), (fij ;j e J)), 
cf. § 1.2). Therefore, for the aims of this work the concept of g.p.i. in preference form 
could be given as the basic notion, instead of the notion of g.p.i. 
Note that also the notion of g.p.i. in preference form is somewhat redundant from 
the formal point of view (as the graph V can be omitted; namely, if J = 0, then 
p = 0 = r , if J 7* 0, then any kj determines X r and, hence, T uniquely). 
2.4. Bergean games with perfect information. 
2.4.0. Any Bergean game with perfect information (that introduced by his general 
definition in [2], Ch. I, § 2) can be defined formally as 
(r9n,(Pl9...,Pn),(kl,...,kn),N\N-) 
where T is a graph, n is a positive integer, N+ u N" = { l , . . . , «} ( = N), N+ n N~ = 
= 0, (P,-; je J) is a partition of P = dom T, and kj(je J) are preference relations 
on P; moreover, Berge supposes that P(j(x)) n Tx = 0 for each xeP. Here N is the 
set of players (or of the numbers of players), elements o fN + [N~] are called active 
[passive] players. For any j e N, there exists exactly one e e {-f-, —} such that 
je Ne; we shall denote this e by e(j). 
2.4.1. It is easy to see that the adequate description of the interests of the players 
in a Bergean g.p.i. (in the sense of § 2.4.0) can be given, in terms of preference rela-
tions on X r , in the following way: iffeN, then the player/s preference relation 
on X = X r equals k(gJj) where g = ({xk; ke Wt}; (xk; ke Wt)e X) (: X-> 
-+ (exp P\ {0})), andiT,- = (X, kfJ)) (§ 1.5). In such a way we have transformed 
any Bergean g.p.i. to a g.p.i. in preference form, and the latter could be "naturally 
represented" by a g.p.i. (cf. § 2.3). In this sense and from our point of view (see 
§ 2.3), Bergean gs. p.i. may be considered as a particular case of gs. p.i. introduced 
in §2.2. 
2.4.2. In the most usual case, the preference relations k j on P of a Bergean g.p.i. 
(§ 2.4.0) are given by real-valued "evaluation functions" f} on P, i.e. ^j = ^(/y,^> 
(cf. § 1.2) where & is the chain of real numbers. It is easy to seelhat in this case the 
natural pay-off function ft = ffj). g [where ffJ) is defined by § 1.4 to 1T = < *̂ = 
= ([— oo, +oo], S) ( ^ is the natural ordering), X = X, and / = / , ] with ^ * 
gives exactly the player / s preference relation (on X) described in § 2.4.1, i.e., 
2.5. Of course, also the usually considered games with perfect information, with 
real-valued pay-off functions, and without chance moves on trees are involved in 
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our definition (§2.2); the most usual case (the tree is finite, and the pay-offs are 
determined by the terminal positions) can be considered as a special case of Bergean 
games with perfect information (each player may be considered as active or as passive, 
and then his evaluation of nonfinal positions is less than or greater than (respectively) 
any evaluation of final positions). (Here we consider trees as special oriented graphs, 
and then the root of any tree is determined by the tree itself; thus, the initial position 
of a game of the mentioned kind need not be presented in the formal definition of the 
game.) 
Supposition. In the remainder of § 2, let 
<3 = (r,(P(f);feJ), (rj = (Vj, ^j)JeJl(fj-JeJ)) 
be a game with perfect information. (Cf. §§ 1.0, 1.7, 2.1.) 
2.6. Convention, definition, p will have the meaning introduced in § 1.14. We shall 
write 
Z(j) = ZnP(j)9 
S(J )=XTz, * = X * 0 ' ) -
*eZ(./) Jej 
Elements of S(j) are called the plain strategies of j (in #). Elements of S are said to 
be the plain strategic situations. 
2.7. Remark. There exists a natural bijection of S onto TF(T), namely (oj; j e J) |-> 
|-> U */ ( f ° r e a c h (<V 7 e / ) e S). (If J = 0, then P = 0, T = 0, S = {0} = TF(T).) 
2.8. In accordance to the well-known fundamental definitions (cf., e.g., [10], 
Ch. VI. 2), the definition of equilibrium point consisting (only) of plain strategies 
(or, as we say, of plain equilibrium point) in some x° e P (this position is considered as 
an initial position) is to be formulated in such a way: a = (oj; j e J) e S is a plain 
equilibrium point (of ^ ) in x° iff for each j 0 e J and each x e Tx° complying with 
Oj for any je J\ {j0} there holds fJo(x) tkj0fjQ(y) where y is that element of Tx° 
which complies with Gj for each j e J; note that it may happen that that x does not 
comply with any plain strategy of the player j . 
Using the 1-1 correspondence among the elements of S and those of TF(T) (§ 2.7), 
we can give the direct definition of plain absolute equilibrium point (cf. § 0) in terms 
of full T-transformations: 
2.9. Definition. Under a plain absolute equilibrium point of ^ we mean a e TF(T) 
such that for each xeP, je J, and for any xeTx complying with a \ (Z\ Z(j)) 
there holds 
fj(x) ^jfMx, ff)). 
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2.10. Remark. Of course, in the situation from § 2.9 /}(x) ^jfj(p(x9 a)) if and 
only if x ^(fjfirj) p(x9 a); therefore, the notion of plain absolute equilibrium point 
could be formulated in terms of preference forms ofgs. p.i. 
2.11. Definition, remark. The game ^ is called antagonistic iff card J = 2 and, 
for {j\, j2} = J, the pay-off functions /,-., fJ2 (with rjl9 rj2) express antagonistic 
preferences. 
E.g., if J = {Ji,J2}- Ji ^J2>
 a n d ^ there exist a real-valued pay-off function/ 
(on T) and real numbers kk9 ck(k = 1, 2) such that / i k = cfc + >^/(k = 1 , 2 ) and 
A{X2 < 0, then ^ is antagonistic. (Cf. § V2.6.) 
If (3 is antagonistic, then we also say ". . . saddle point" instead of ". . . equilibrium 
point". 
§3. T H E M A I N T H E O R E M . P A R T I C U L A R C A S E S 
(See the conventions in §§ 1.0, 1.7, 2.1, 2.6.) 
3.0. The main theorem. Let 
9 = (T, (P(j); j e J), (r} = (Vj 9£jY,jeJ)9 (fj; j e J)) 
be a game with perfect information. 
Let there exist a pseudolength L* (on T) with a chain W* = (W*, <£*), and, for 
eachj e J, an L*-qualitative pay-off function f* such that the following statements (0), 
(A), (B) are satisfied: 
(0) For each j e J,fj (with r j) is an L*-quasiqualitative pay-off function complying 
v.ithf*. 
(A): 
(A.l) {L*((x)); xeP0} is well-ordered (in TT*) . 
(A.2) Let W^Z, (j(z); ze V)e X ( ^ \ V), (y(-); z e V ) e X - > ( z ) ; let set 
zey zey 
{y(z); z e V} be p/a/n, and let each y(z) (z e V) pass in P\ V. Then {L*(z © y(z)); 
z e V} is well-ordered (in W*). 
(B) Let z e Z, (y(z); y e Tz) e X *>, and let set {y(y); y e Tz} be plain. Then 
y eYz 
(B/l) {fjiz)(z © y(y)); y e Tz} is inversely well-ordered in rjiz^; 
(BI2) if {fJiz)(y(y)Y ye Tz} {;} {-1}, then set {L*(z © y(y)Y yeTz} 
. (inversely well-ordered) V//**\ 
(well-ordered j ' '' 
Then the game <g has a plain absolute equilibrium point. 
3.1. Remark. The proof is presented in § 4. The idea of the construction of a plain 
absolute equilibrium point of the game ^ is based mainly on the condition (0); 
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each of the conditions DD (1) — (3), (o) — (iii), (I) — (4) is used essentially in the 
proof. The realization of this idea necessitates certain auxiliary "technical" conditions; 
we have chosen the conditions (A) and (B). This choice seems to be the most useful; 
our aim is not the full utilization of such conditions, we only wish to obtain immedi-
ately a number of important particular cases from a common result, and the theorem 
serves well for this aim, as we show in the following. 
3.2. Theorem. Let 
9 = (T,(P(j);jeJ),(rj = (Vj9 ^ ; j e J),(/.; fe J)) 
be a game with perfect information. 
Let L* be a pseudolength (on T) with a chain if* — (W*, <; *), and, for each je J, 
let f* be an L*-qualitative pay-off function such that fj (with*fj) is an \J*-quasiquali-
tative pay-off function complying with f*. 
Let there occur at least one of the following three cases: 
(I) P is finite. 
(II) im L* is well-ordered (in if*), and Tx is finite for each xeP. 
(Ill) im L* is finite, imfj is inversely well-ordered for eachje J. 
Then the conditions (A) and (B) from the main theorem are satisfied, and (therefore) 
the game & has a plain absolute equilibrium point. 
(The p r o o f is trivial.) 
3.3. Remark. Of course, at applying the theorem, further trivial or simple pro-
positions could be used (X is finite => P is finite; if* is finite => im L* is finite, 
etc.; see §1.1). The case (II) is involved, e.g., in the following case (H+), and 
the latter is sufficient (in the situation from § 3.2) for the satisfaction of (A) and (B), 
too : 
(II+) im L* is well-ordered (in if*), and for each zeZ there exists a set Y ^ Tz 
such that sets {/}(z)(Z ® y); y e Y, y e Ty} and {L*(Z © y); y e Y, y e Ty} are inversely 
well-ordered (in Y' j{z) and if*, respectively), and Tz \ Y is finite. 
(Namely, {L*(z 0 y); ye Y, y e f > } is finite if it is inversely-well ordered, as im L* 
is well-ordered (cf. § 1.1); the case (II) occurs if the choice Y -= 0 is admissible for 
each zeZ.) 
3.4. Theorem. Let 
<8 = (T,(P(j)',jeJ),(rj = (Vj, ^J);jeJ),(fj;jeJ)) 
be a game with perfect information. 
If & is locally finite and, for each j e / , /} satisfies the condition D(J) and im /} 
is inversely well-ordered (in i^j), then & has a plain absolute equilibrium point. 
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(This follows immediately from §§1.21 (cf. (C) => (B)) and 3.2 (cf. case (III); namely, 
im L° £ {oo}).) 
3.5. Remark. Important corollaries of § 3.4 can be obtained by means of § 1.24.1, 
which presents a general construction of pay-ofT functions (on locally finite graphs) 
satisfying D(T). In particular, there holds: 
The Berge variant of the Zermelo — von Neumann theorem (cf. §§ 0, 3.6). Any 
locally finite Bergean game with perfect information and finite-value^ evaluation fun-
ctions (§§ 2.4.2, 2.4.0) has a plain absolute equilibrium point. 
[Namely, in the considered case plain absolute equilibrium points can be defined 
in terms of the natural pay-off functions (cf. §§2A0, 2.4A, 2.4.2), but, evidently, 
the latter can be expressed in the way mentioned in § 2.4A (and, hence, they satisfy 
D(l)), and they are finite-valued. Thus, the proposition follows from § 3.4.] 
3.6. Remark, definition. Under a weak plain absolute equilibrium point of a 
game 
<0 == (r,(P(f);Je/),(^. = (Vj, Sj);JeJ),(fj;jeJ)) 
with perfect information we mean o e TF(T) such that for any je J and a' e TF(F) 
o' | (Z' \ Z(j)) = o\(Z\ Z(j)) =>//*>(*, <r')) £j fj(p(x, a)). 
It is clear that if a is a plain absolute equilibrium point of ^, then o is a weak plain 
absolute equilibrium point of ^. On the other hand, if r contains no cyclic path 
(under a cyclic path of T we mean a finite sequence x0, ..., xm e P(m = 0) such that 
Xj e Txj- x forj = 1,..., m9 and x0 e Txm), then any weak plain absolute equilibrium 
point of ^ is a plain absolute equilibrium point of <g [namely, if a e TF(r), j e J, 
and if x e X r complies with o \ (Z\Z(j)), then there exists c' GT F (T) such that 
x = p(x9 o') (etc., cf. § 2.9)]. Clearly, if T is locally finite, then it contains no cyclic 
path. 
The notion of weak plain absolute equilibrium point expresses, in terms of this 
paper (and for the games considered here), the original Berge's notion of "(absolute) 
equilibrium point" (see [2], Ch. I, §§ 7 and 3). The preceding remarks show that 
the formulation of the Berge theorem used in § 3.5 is equivalent to the original Berge's 
formulation (in [2], Ch. I, § 7), although the latter concerns weak plain absolute 
equilibrium points. 
3.7. Theorem. Let 
<# = (r,(PU)'JeJ)9(rj = (Vj9 ^j);jeJ),(fjU'eJ)) 
be a two-player game with perfect information, let J = {JiJi}-
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Let there exist real numbers Xk, ck(k = 1 , 2 ) and a real-valued pay-off function f 
(on T) such that the conditions (a), (/>), (y) (§ 1.22) are satisfied, and 
fjk = ck + XJ (k = 1, 2), 
At . A2 < 0. 
Let there occur at least one of the following two cases: 
(V) P is finite. 
(IF) {|/(x) |; x e X} is inversely well-ordered, and Tx is finite for each xeP. 
Then <3 has a plain absolute saddle point. 
Proof. Let if*,f*, L* be the same as in § 1.22, let/,* = / * . sgn Xk(k = 1, 2). 
By means of §§ 1.22, 1.25.2, 1.26 (especially, cf. part c)) we conclude that L* with 
if* is a pseudolength (on T) and, for e a c h f e J , / * is an L*-qualitative pay-oif 
function such that /} is an L*-quasiqualitative pay-off function complying with 
/ * . Evidently, if {|/(x) |; x e X} is inversely well-ordered, then (cf. § 1.22) im L* 
is well-ordered. Consequently, if (K') holds for K = I or K = II, tfyen we have the 
case (K) from § 3.2; therefore (see §§ 1.26, 2.11) ^ has a plain absolute saddle point. 
3.8. Remark. Of course, it would be possible to derive a certain corollary of the 
main theorem for the antagonistic case (by means of a suitable re-formulation of the 
"technical conditions" (A), (B) (§ 3.0) to pay-off functions constructed by means 
of §§ 1.22 and 1.26, etc.), but we take interest in (immediately applicable) important 
particular cases (cf. §3.1); thus, we have based the antagonistic-case result (§3.7) 
directly on § 3.2. (Note that the case (III) in § 3.2 is not useful here, as it would 
lead to 
(III) { I / M l ; * e X } and {L(x); x e X } are finite, 
but this gives only a very special case of the situation considered in § 3.4.) 
3.9. Remark. Important corollaries of § 3.7 can be obtained by means of § 1.23, 
which presents a general construction of (some) functions / ( § 1.22), and by means 
of the special cases considered in §§ 1.24.2 — 3. Especially, the result obtained by 
means of §§ 3.7 and 1.24.3 [it is easy to see how the direct expression of the notion 
of plain absolute saddle point is to be formulated (cf. [6], § 3.16, too); note that 
it is sufficient to take the case 
(II") Tx is finite for each xeP, 
cf. §§ 1.24.3, 1.22] involves the original result of Zermelo (proved for chess in [14]); 
cf. § 0. 
(To be continued) 
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